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Though highly controversial, the origins of pleabargaining are surprisingly obscure. While oftenthought to be either an innovation or a corruption
of the American courts after World War II, it has much
deeper historical roots. Plea bargaining is defined here as a
defendant’s entry of a guilty plea in anticipation of
concessions from the prosecutor or judge. It may be
implicit or explicit and need not yield concessions in every
case.
To explore the rise of plea bargaining, I examine its
beginnings in antebellum Boston, Massachusetts – the first
sustained instance of the practice known to exist. Boston
was a national centre of legal innovation from which many
legal ideas and practices spread to other cities through
diffusion (Novak, 1996). Plea bargaining very probably was
one such distributed legal innovation. An urban political
elite, seeking to maintain its position of power, played a key
role in its establishment. It was this elite’s perception of
crisis and threat, along with its effort to preserve social
order, the legitimacy of self-rule and its own dominance,
that produced in a single New England locale the practice
of plea bargaining that would then become a national and,
eventually, international phenomenon.
POST-INDEPENDENCE CONFLICT: CRISIS
AND THE RE-MAKING OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY
In the years after the American Revolution, politicians
worked to re-create political authority anew for a self-
governing republican society. Yet their project faced the
obstacle that this authority was to be anchored in popular
self rule but, at the same time, to be constructed during
the 1830s which was a period when concentration of
wealth and economic inequality increased more rapidly
than any other time in the 19th century. Recently,
historians such as Gordon Wood (1992), have shown
compellingly how intensely conflicted was the social and
political landscape of the early American republic.
This “formative era” of American law was one of
perceived crisis of unrest and political instability in the
republic. Its timing was crucial because it occurred just as
suffrage was “universally” extended. Together these events
evoked new state responses to social conflict (on the
importance of timing in the convergence of social and
political forces, see further Nicos Poulantzas, Political power
and social classes, New Left Books, London, 1975; Reinhard
Bendix, National building and citizenship, Wiley, New York,
1964). As the voting public grew, uncertainty ran high as to
whether self-governance would prove viable and what path
politics might take. This public concern also spawned the
movement for common schooling in Boston under the
leadership of Horace Mann which marked the beginning of
public education in the United States.
State response to the crisis was needed that would be
defensible in a world of popular rule. Amidst a re-scripting
of legal practices that took place, one innovation, plea
bargaining, achieved special prominence. Plasticity of
institutions and practices at this creative time, when judges
were forging legal institutions into a modern form much of
which they retain today, facilitated creation of new legal
mechanisms and, once formed, allowed them to achieve a
permanence not otherwise possible.
During the 1830s and 1840s, rioting and unrest were
widespread. The earliest factories were constructed which
changed both forms of production and working
conditions. City life brought diverse strangers of unequal
rank into contact. These, coupled with new waves of
immigrants, created a vibrant and tumultuous urban scene.
Officials, already focused on the danger that conflict posed
to property, social order and growth, grew anxious
(Horwitz, 1977; Nedelsky, 1990). Religious belief,
previously a source of cohesion, and social consensus,
which had pervaded small scale community life, were also
eroding (Nelson, 1981; Lockridge, 1981). Constant spatial
movement and turnover among residents in city
neighbourhoods amplified the strains of inequality (Sellers,
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1991). Irish immigrants began to coalesce as a major
presence too. Amidst these pressures, conflict, unrest and
violence, rather than harmony, was the order of the day.
Because self-rule was still new and local political
capacity for responding to conflict was limited, there arose
a sense of crisis and of threat to both the social order and
to the elite power embedded in it. It was desire, in this
context, to protect order and to reconsolidate the city
elite’s partisan control that elicitied new state responses.
Spurred on by the election of Andrew Jackson to the
Presidency, strikes by the Workingmen’s movement swept
the American northeast between 1833 and 1836. Their
crusade was for a 10-hour working day – a goal that, by
1836, had essentially been achieved (Sellers, 1991, p 338).
Yet, their discourse endured. Labour leaders charged that
“capital divided society into two classes, the producing
many and the exploiting few, by expropriating the fruits of
labour” (Sellers, 1991, p. 338). Working men challenged
growing inequality that let a privileged few flourish at the
expense of many. Resentment simmered. By the 1830s,
public concern was widespread about the future of
republican self-rule. Workers began to use the language of
republicanism in new ways that now viewed the holistic
interests of the society through a new modestly socialist
lens (Forbath, 1991). Social disorder, riots and strikes
riveted elected officials. To defuse resentment and reassert
control, they turned for help to the ideology of a “rule of
law.”
By this point, conflict had gripped the public
imagination. Ethnic diversity and contention soared as did
images of the Irish as one major source of the turmoil
Adding to these ethnic tensions was a palpable public fear
of crime – especially violence. Recently, Eric Monkkonnen
(1996) has presented data for New York City showing that
the 1820s experienced not just heightened fear, but a very
real increase in actual homicide – a trend that peaked
nationally during the 1850s (Gurr, 1981). Addressing the
Boston City Council on September 18, 1837, Mayor Eliot
decried the threat posed by “the incendiary, burglar and
the lawlessly violent” which was “increasing at a ratio faster
than that of the population” (cited in Lane, 1971, p 34).
Data on arrests in Boston are available only for 1831 and
1850 so that, questions of the relation of arrests to
offences actually committed aside, detailed analysis of
arrests over this period is not possible. However, data on
commitments of those convicted to the Boston Jail show a
45 per cent increase in just four years between 1830–34 –
the only early 19th century years for which those records
appear to exist – as compared to only a 25 per cent
increase in the population of the City of Boston for the
entire decade 1830–40 (Council of the Massachusetts
Temperance Society, 1834, p 81 and Handlin, 1979,
p239).
Probably the clearest sign of public fear is that the Mayor
requested and obtained funds to establish a paid police
force for the city. Pointing to the “spirit of violence
abroad”, Eliot argued that the residents must be protected.
Whether disorder and crime actually were rising or were
simply perceived now as more threatening, it is clear that
violence was pervasive.
During the 1830s, a remarkable spate of riots and routs
occurred. Two events, in particular, brought public distress
to a fever pitch – the burning of an Ursuline Convent in
Charlestown in a flare-up of anti-Irish sentiment in 1834
and the famed Broad Street riot of 1837. After the “Mount
Benedict Outrage”, as the convent fire was known, public
agitation soared. It was seen as “a riot with social, even
political implications”. (Lane, 1971, p 30). By then, city
officials, who were very aware of similar happenings in
England and on the Continent, were acutely sensitive to
the political potential of such events. (Lane, 1971, p 30).
In 1836 and 1837 an economic downturn, followed by
financial panic, further fanned fears about the fragility of
the new order. Unease created by daily contact among
persons of diverse ranks in the city amplified fears as the
lives of the poor impinged ever more on the consciousness
of the affluent (Lane, 1971).
As labour unrest, ethnic conflict and crime mounted,
shockwaves were buffered less than they had traditionally
been by the erosion of shared religious values and cultural
commonalities (Wiebe, 1966). Thus, during the 1830s,
when social conflict grew, amidst weakened cultural
consensus, it produced an acute sense of crisis in the new
order. Response to this crisis was shaped by its timing
which caused state action to be devised in the context of
two other key happenings (Poulantzas, 1975). Extension of
the vote meant that any initiative must take a form that
would sustain the popular consent crucial to self-rule.
There was also emerging a new conscious campaign to
promote social policy and the “people’s welfare” through
law (Horwitz, 1977). The fact that crisis emerged during
this “formative era” of American law created a special
window of opportunity for cultural change.
THE LEGAL ESTABLISHMENT AND THE
LEGACY OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY
FEDERALISM
Almost without exception, the Massachusetts bar, after
the War of Independence, consisted of, first, Federalists
and, later, Whigs (Warren, 1931, pp 174, 178). During the
“formative era”, lawyers achieved new influence after they
recovered from an immediate post-Revolutionary period
of disrepute. This political collegiality in the sympathies of
the bar was reinforced by a long tradition of fraternity,
practical exchange of ideas and fellow feeling, on the one
hand, and, first, Federalist, and, then, Whig control of the
Commonwealth’s judicial appointments, on the other, to
ensure that the courts were presided over by judges in step
with the policies of these successive elite-dominated
parties. 3
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Concern about lawyers’ political allegiances was
aggravated by the extensive part they were playing in state
government. Nathaniel Ames argued that separation of
powers was breached as lawyers wrought their influence
simultaneously by their votes, their courtroom activities,
and their candidacies for elected office (Warren, 1931, p
179). Denouncing the lawyers’ influence in colourful
terms, Nathaniel Ames wrote: “… he that is not now a
Lawyer, or tool of a Lawyer, is considered only fit to carry
guts to a bear in New England” (Nathaniel Ames,
Columbian Minerva, September 6, 1803; cited in Warren,
1931, p. 180).
Thus, the “law craft”, as a bastion of Federalism,
possessed a distinctive ideological stance. As lawyers’ status
improved after the Revolution and they moved between
careers in the bar, the judiciary and politics, they carried
with them the unique political outlook of the
Federalist/Whig elite and, with it, a clear commitment to
their policies as ones that might best serve the “public
good.” As criminal courts innovated in their efforts to
contain conflict, protect property and dampen the violence
and rioting so destructive to prosperity, first, Federalist
and, later, Whig ideas coloured the thinking of judges
about the need for order and what policies might achieve
it.
POPULAR CHALLENGE TO THE COMMON
LAW
Critique of lawyers, largely on grounds of their
Federalist views, gradually came during the early 1800s to
be associated in the public mind with opposition to the
common law. Many states had, after the American
Revolution, initially adopted much of British Common
Law and public attitudes toward it had been positive. After
1800, however, things changed (Horwitz, 1977, p 5).
Previously the Common Law had been viewed as a fixed,
customary standard. Judges envisioned their task as
discovery and application of pre-existing rules (Horwitz,
1977, pp 8–9). This produced a strict conception of
precedent and a popular view of law as, if not always fair,
at least known.
In the closing years of the 18th century, however, signs
of change appeared in both criminal and civil spheres
(Horwitz, 1977). Its roots were twofold. The first was
states rights constitutional theories which depicted law-
finding based on precedent as a form of “ex post facto” law.
The second was new conceptions of the basis of
legitimation of political authority which portrayed the
customary approach of common law as outdated in light of
popular sovereignty. The constitutional challenge argued
that if judges could impose criminal penalties without laws
being enacted in statute, the application of precedent after
an act had occurred constituted ex post facto law. It punished
a person left in ignorance at time of the act of precisely
what the law prohibited and, thus, breached constitutional
limits on state power (Horwitz, 1977, pp. 11 and 14). As
ideas about the basis of political authority changed, it
meant that the common law, with its roots in custom, was
incompatible with authority based on laws reflecting
popular sovereignty.
Initially these sentiments generated calls for
abandonment of the Common Law and a move to enacted
statute. The codification movement sought to recognize
primacy of “the peoples” elected representatives and to
move from case law to statutory enactments.
Yet, judges, who were overwhelmingly Federalist-
appointed, and political leaders resisted the move to statute
precisely because of the power it would have given to
legislative bodies dominated by the middling and lower
classes. Instead, they, together with what was then the
Federalist elite, fought to maintain judicial discretion by
preserving reliance on the common law (Horwitz, 1977, p
21). Although the codification movement ultimately failed,
it signalled public interest in reducing the discretion of
judges and in simplifying and clarifying law, before the fact,
and communicating knowable legal rules and procedures
to the citizenry. In part the movement foundered due to a
compromise proposal advanced by Joseph Story that “a
digest [be prepared], under legislative authority, of the
settled portions of the common law” (Jones et al, 1993, p
35).
Complexity, a separate but related matter, also became a
basis for challenge. In response to persistent criticism of
lawyers, the courts and even the common law, Supreme
Judicial Court Justice Theodore Sedgwick, a conservative
from Stockbridge, urged reform arguing that only if the
courts were “wise, simple and expedient” would people
consider it “the most certain means of attaining justice”
and use them rather than extra-judicial means for resolving
conflicts (Jones et al, 1993, p 30).
EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE AND THE
POLITICS OF CONSENT
By the end of Jackson’s second Presidential term in the
mid-1830s, “universal” suffrage was a fact of life and
reconstituting politics. By easing restrictions, such as
property ownership and the poll tax, states extended the
vote to new segments of the labouring classes though a
goodly share of Boston’s citizens had already voted before.
Artisans and workers now produced more representative
assemblies though a lingering tradition of deference meant
that the result was not immediate. Elected leaders, in turn,
faced new constraints as their decisions increasingly
required at least some broad based popular consent. This
abetted a move, already under way, to challenge the
political control of Boston’s Federalist elite (Lane, 1971).
It also aroused worries about what other forms,
particularly with respect to property, contestation might
take. Joseph Story noted, at one point, that the lawyer’s
most “glorious and not infrequently perilous”
responsibility was to protect the “sacred rights of4
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property” from the “rapacity” of the “majority” (Story,
1829; cited in Mensch, 1982).
While proprietors complained that conflict marred
quality of life, city leaders worried about even more far-
reaching consequences (Lane, 1971). Familiar as they were
with the rioting and revolt in Europe during the 1820s and
1830s, Boston’s politicians worked feverishly to restore
order, reconsolidate their partisan base, and cement
popular commitment to the institutions of the republic.
Because the franchise precluded solutions to disorder and
unrest that jeopardized voter support, new responses had
to be devised not only to violence, property crime and riot
but to growing political tensions too.
The courts, which provided Americans’ primary
experience of the state before local political parties formed
in the 1840s, now assumed a key role (Skowronek, 1982).
Beginning in the 1820s, a first wave of court reform had
established the Boston Police Court. It was a reform
spearheaded by Boston’s leading citizens and it aimed to
re-establish the lower courts as a respected and well-used
forum for resolving conflict (Hindus, 1980; Dimond,
1975). This responded both to the demands of the
propertied for security and, even more, to the “claims [for
a just forum on the part] of a [lower] class [whom they felt
it] unsafe to deny” (Lane, 1971, p 23). Additional
institutional and cultural changes followed very soon.
By the 1830s, Boston’s local officials were “no longer so
firmly united by ties of class and [state] party [affiliation] as
their predecessors [had been]” (Lane, 1971, p 46). The
city maintained a one-party tradition where “candidates
labelled Democrat … had [in most years virtually] no
chance of … [electoral] success” (Lane, 1971, p 47).
However, the times were creating intractable dilemmas for
the beleaguered [Federalist and, then, Whig] municipal
authorities and “hopes for the material future were
[increasingly] balanced by fear for the political” (Lane,
1971, pp 47, 60). Under pressure, elite Bostonians
experimented with new alternatives. To take one step
“backward” to reconsolidate elite power, this city with its
tradition of single-party Federalist/Whig control was
forced to take several small steps forward in the service of
consensus-building and reform.
Strategies to restore order were conceived, then, at a
time that precluded politics as usual. The Whigs feared
threats, not only to property per se, but even more to the
stability in day to day affairs that investment and growth
required. (Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776),
cited the task of providing the security and predictability
needed for commerce as one of two essential roles of the
post-mercantilist state. Insurance companies were working
at precisely the time of this study to rationalize and
diminish risk (Steinberg, personal communication with the
author, 1997)). Fearing for the future, leaders worked to
nurture order and predictability in public life and to
cultivate the consent of citizens to both institutions of self-
rule and the stewardship of their party. To this end, they
approached social control, not through overtly coercive
means, but in ways that underscored the party’s claim to
serve the will of the people.
City officials and elite civic leaders accomplished this by
appealing to the pre-eminent social discourse of the day –
that of a “rule of law”. By common agreement, they
argued, social life must proceed according to a body of
rules specified in advance and oriented to fairness. Such
rules, they contended, apply universally to every citizen
and prescribe equal treatment for each accused person in
court. Then, in a dramatic claim, it was argued that, even
when such rules depart from popular opinion, they must,
unceasingly, be observed. Only through adherence to legal
principles and procedures, leaders argued, could the new
project of self-rule be sustained. By appealing to the
language of the widely revered “rule of law” as a basis for
cultural imagery, they hoped to bolster both social order
and the legitimacy and authority of republican institutions.
With order restored, they believed they could re-secure
their hold on power.
The language in which the reforms were advanced
reveals how officials viewed them. When, in 1822, the
Police Court had been established, Mayor Josiah Quincy
unveiled his plan by denouncing the potential for social
conflict inherent in the previous system of Justices of the
Peace. Quincy argued that “whenever confidence …
[lapses] in the lower tribunals, there is no justice … [for]
the poor, who cannot afford to carry their causes to the
higher ones” (Quincy, 1822, pp 7-8). Such injustice, he
proclaimed, corrupts the morality and political
commitment of citizens. Quincy referred, among other
things, to the prior fee structure whereby magistrates had
prospered the greater the number of cases heard.
Anticipating a point later made by Max Weber, Quincy
argued that where political authority anchors its
legitimation in legal rules, the danger is especially great
when that law is perceived as unjust. The risk is that laws,
so viewed, may be treated as no law at all and that political
authority itself will then be undercut. Following quickly
upon court reform, other major new institutions including
prisons and reformatories, a house of industry and a
professional police force were also set in place.
As new institutions moved into motion, judicial
decision-making and court procedure also changed –
although more informally and incrementally. Judges’
decisions took on a policy focus (Horwitz, 1977). In the
criminal courts, pardons, the nolle prosse, the plea of nolo
contendere and grants of immunity had already begun to be
used in new, explicitly conditional ways to further specific
policy goals.
Plea bargaining now made its debut in the courts. Here
Max Weber’s insights into legal change are helpful. Weber
argues that development of new legal norms and practices
has always been the product of innovation, or the 5
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construction of new lines of action, in settings where an
existing repertoire does not suffice (Weber, 1978, pp
753–784). Typically these changes are initiated, Weber
contends, by status groups acting on the basis of interest.
As time goes on, the innovations first acquire the power of
habit, then, of norms and, finally, they are formalized in
law. Plea bargaining developed very much in such a
progression.
Although the practice of plea bargaining arose during a
period of reform, it was not advanced as a unitary plan or
formal initiative. Instead, it emerged as an informal and
pragmatic accretion of small changes in the customary
practice of the courts that was, only then, culturally
codified. In light of the small gradual shifts in court
practice through which plea bargaining emerged, the origin
of this practice resembles other key legal developments,
such as the rise of the prosecutor, described by John
Langbein (1973).
LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL
POLICY: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
During the “formative era”, judges began to
reconceptualize American law as an instrument of social
policy. This transformation in law, combined with state
structure, made it likely that political response to crisis
would come through the courts. As judges changed the way
they envisioned their role, they increasingly crafted their
decisions with an eye to policy implications beyond their
case at hand (Horwitz, 1977). In private law, case decisions
aimed to facilitate healthy markets and economic growth
(Horwitz, 1977). In the criminal courts, judges sought to
assure behaviour that would uphold social order and,
especially, foster the security and predictability needed for
development (Vogel, 1999).
The early 1800s had been a “disruptive and potentially
radical period” (Mensch, 1982, p19). As American leaders
and jurists worked to re-establish post-independence
political authority, they came to rely heavily on the courts
where the role of judges was changing. It was the effort to
reconcile the tension between judicial discretion and
popular will, mentioned above in the context of the
common law, that contributed mightily to what Horwitz
(1977) has called the “transformation of American law”.
Judges increasingly bridged the gap between common law
and “the people” by envisioning themselves as agents of
“popular sovereignty”. They came to view their role as that
of activist and innovator functioning on behalf of the
“common good” (Horwitz, 1977, p 30). In the course of
this change, judges began to view law as a policy
instrument (Horwitz, 1977). Increasingly, judges
articulated decisions and used law as a tool to shape the
path of social change. In Mark DeWolfe Howe’s words, “it
was as clear to laymen as it was to lawyers that the nature
of American institutions … was largely to be determined
by the judges … (and that) questions of … law were …
considered as questions of social policy” (Howe, 1947–50;
cited in Horwitz, 1977). Howe’s words bespoke a
conscious turn by the state to the courts, among other
institutions, to promote its policies.
Judicial discretion, specifically in sentencing, was no
exception. Mayor Josiah Quincy emphasized the existence
of such discretion in his address to the Grand Jury of
Suffolk County when he observed “There is, indeed, a
discretion invested in judges” (Quincy, 1822, p 12). That
he believed such discretion should be informed by social
policy in shaping sentencing Quincy left no doubt. He
proclaimed that “The utility of a concentrated system of
penal and criminal law in which punishment shall be
graduated by the nature and aggravation of crime and
adapted to the actual state of society and public sentiment
[emphasis this author’s], … [is] appreciated” (p 14). That
judges’ discretion in the criminal sphere centred on
sentencing policy, Quincy also emphasized. He noted that
a judge’s discretion included selecting “time and place [of
imprisonment]” as well as other aspects of the severity of
sanction (p 12). Public knowledge of such policy uses of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion in sentencing was
widespread and the practice met with legislative approval
(House Report, Massachusetts Legislature, No 4, January
1845).
EMERGENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING:
CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Given the paucity of local political institutions and the
many challenges of the day, during the early to mid-19th
century, the courts emerged as central in shaping the
relation of citizens to the state. At this point, they stepped
forward as agents of the state to promote political stability,
to enhance the legitimation of institutions of self-rule by
nurturing political authority and to create conditions
conducive to healthy economic development. (For more
detailed analysis of the historical origins of plea bargaining,
see Mary E Vogel, “The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining:
Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation,
1830–1860”, Law and Society Review, vol 33, no 1, March
1999).
Reaching back into the traditions of the common law,
the courts turned to mechanisms of discretionary, or
episodic, leniency. Through these practices, leniency was
frequently, but not always, accorded and so could not be
counted on and taken for granted. What was unique about
the tradition of leniency was that to qualify for it one relied
on the intercession of what were essentially character
witnesses to whom one was known. As Thompson (1975)
and Hay et al (1975) have shown, in England where
litigation was also widespread, practices of leniency created
incentives to appreciate, nurture and reciprocate social ties
and bonds of patronage with those more privileged. In this
way, one might benefit from the goodwill to cause a
prosecution to be foregone or to have a powerful patron to
plead for mercy if one ran afoul of the law.6
Amicus Curiae Issue 57 January/February 2005
The result, in England, was a system of justice that
reinforced the stability of the class structure, despite vast
material inequality, through these social ties that it fostered
at the same time that it bolstered political legitimacy by
affirming a formal message of universality (ie, law applies
to all) and equality (ie, formally equal treatment
procedurally) before the law. In the United States, plea
bargaining emerged as the most widespread form of
episodic leniency – one which also promoted stability –
but now in new ways in a context of popular electoral
politics.
First signs of plea bargaining appear in the lower court
of Boston in the 1830s (Vogel, 1988, 1999) – in Boston,
the lower court was the Police Court (later renamed the
Municipal Court) which is the equivalent of a country
district court. Before that time, both bargained guilty pleas
(either explicit or tacitly implicit) and, in fact, guilty pleas
altogether were quite rare (Alschuler, 1979; Langbein,
1978). This same “backwardness of the courts in receiving
a plea of guilty” is again mentioned in Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Law of England (1765, cited by
Alschuler) and approved by Chitty (1816, cited by
Alschuler). In fact, judges exhorted defendants to exercise
the hard won rights of the republic against self-
incrimination and warned of penalties if they failed to do
so. Nor, according to prior research by John Langbein and
others, did the practice exist in England or elsewhere
before the 19th century. Although leniency in the form of
pardons and grants of clemency has a long history, those
did not involve direct exchange and never achieved the
pervasive, routine use that plea bargaining did.
Yet, in Boston, during the 1830s and 1840s, this
changed with the beginnings of plea bargaining. Guilty
pleas, the first element of bargaining that appears together
with concessions in disposition or sentencing, were first
entered in significant numbers during the 1830s and, by
1840, were widely accepted – a pattern that continued
into the 20th century (Vogel, 1999). Overall guilty pleas
surged from less than 15 per cent of all cases entered in the
docket in 1830 to 17 per cent in 1840 and then to a high
of 88 per cent in 1880 (Vogel, 1999). This dovetails with
Raymond Moley’s (1929) New York finding that by 1838,
15 per cent of all felony convictions in Manhattan and
Brooklyn were the product of guilty pleas. By 1869 he
found that guilty pleas accounted for 75 per cent of all
convictions.
However, defendants’ tendency to plead guilty varied
among different types of offences with bargained pleas,
initially, most common in the Boston Police Court for
property offences and least for offences against the moral
order (Vogel, 1999). Fisher (2000) suggests that some
charge bargaining may have occurred in the mid-tier courts
in Massachusetts for several decades in regulatory and
capital cases from the late 18th into the early 19th
centuries and then abruptly stopped. However, the extent
to which the record books from which he draws cases for
study may dwell primarily on complex cases that cannot be
encompassed in the docket is not fully known.
Thus, any attempt to generalize from cases “sampled”
from the record books to the population of cases appearing
before those courts must be viewed with greatest caution.
Nor does this study distinguish between negotiated pleas of
nolo contendere which began in the higher courts and were
consummated by lawyers, on the one hand, and the much
newer bargained guilty pleas accomplished initially by a
defendant before a judge and without counsel, on the
other.
Turning to cultural traditions of the common law,
Bostonians, during the late 1830s and 1840s, reworked
elements of the tradition of discretion and episodic
leniency into the practice of plea bargaining which while
closing cases in a much and vociferously sought reform,
retained for the courts considerable control over both
sentencing and its implementation. Judges took standard
vehicles of leniency, such as the pardon in which leniency
was traditionally granted after conviction, and moved it up
to a point before a decision was yet made – giving it a more
contractual quality. In the case of pleas of nolo contendere,
which were used with some frequency, especially in
regulatory cases, conditions might be specified explicitly
for the grant of leniency. Much less complicated and almost
always conditionless was the guilty plea bargain which
emerged in criminal cases – especially those of larceny and
assault.
At a time when the Bar was under challenge to allow any
man legitimately hired by a litigant to argue a case in court
(a proposal ultimately defeated), the simplicity of plea
bargaining and absence of arcane legal formalities had
popular appeal. Pressures to popularize the practice of law
were strong enough that the legislature, in 1835–48,
removed control over admission to the bar from the
Suffolk County Bar Association to its own agents. In
response, the Bar Association disbanded in 1836 and did
not reconstitute itself formally until after mid-century,
although it continued to function as an extremely powerful
private club with strong personal ties and networks of
connection to the bench. Though informally constituted,
the bar maintained its influence over the legal profession
and the law in both old and new ways. In addition to
personal and family ties, along with lingering fondness for
mentors of apprenticeship days, lawyers met at the Social
Law library in Boston and for meals, and, most
importantly, “frequently corresponded with Supreme
Judicial Court justices such as Lemuel Shaw, requesting
copies of legal opinions and commenting on points of law”
(Jones et al, 1993, p 38).
Since many lawyers were also involved in politics, we
have every reason to believe that judges’ awareness of
Federalist and, later, Whig policy objectives was high.
Specific reforms, such as the 1841 request for a change in
chancery rules, were sometimes proposed (Jones et al, 7
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1993, p 32). Such exchange of ideas dated back to at least
1814 when the court considered complaints from lawyers
that the circuit delayed and, thus, denied justice in Suffolk
County (Jones et al, 1993, p 33). A permanent court for
the county was soon established.
Plea bargaining appears to have been espoused by old
political and social elites whose electoral power was under
siege because of the continued control it gave them, in a
broad sense, through judicial discretion over sentencing
policy. In Boston, during the early decades of the 19th
century, virtually the entire Bar consisted of former
Federalists – now Whigs. While committed to a
“republican” vision, their outlook, like that of many of
Boston’s elite Brahmin families, was a different, more
forward looking variant of Jefferson’s bucolic trust in the
freeman farmer that accepted manufacturing, commerce
and industrialization as the inevitable path of change. Thus,
a fundamental commonality of political vision, along with
strong social and institutional ties, created both affinity and
frequent mingling among the members of the bar, the
judiciary and Boston’s elite privileged inner circle.
Defendants, largely lower class persons in the lower
court, accepted the practice because it held out a sense of
leniency, the appearance of control over one’s fate through
negotiation, and the elimination of intrusive state oversight
of the lives of defendants through what had been the
increasingly frequent practice of leaving cases “open” on
file. By offering leniency, closure of cases and some control
over the outcome the Whigs hoped to draw conflicts into
the courts before they could escalate in other realms – thus
promoting the stability needed for growth. The
opportunity to gain experience making decisions among
structured options in a public setting was also used as a
process to educate the masses in both a conception of
citizenship and a sense of the responsibilities it involved.
Plea bargaining emerged as a significant phenomenon
during the 1830s and by 1840 the practice of granting
concessions in cases where such a plea had been entered
was set in place and continued into the 20th century
(Vogel, 1999). Plea bargaining did not emerge as a full
blown plan or scheme. Instead it was the product of
gradual incremental improvisation by a Whig political elite
seeking to bolster social order so vital to the healthy
functioning of markets and to economic development and,
with it, their own flagging political fortunes. Though
informal, plea bargaining responded to various criticisms
of criminal justice afoot in that day – namely claims that
18th century justice had been too expensive, hard to
understand and slow. With its simplicity, rationality and
regularity, plea bargaining offered a routinization that was
appealing. In its exchange, albeit symbolic, the practice
drew the attention of not only defendants but also the
public to the precise costs of criminal acts in a way
favoured by consequentialists. Popular court vignettes
appeared in city newspapers and communicated both case
outcomes and often a moral lesson to readers on a daily
basis.
THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF CONSENT
Besides providing advantages to city officials, to Boston’s
social elite, and to defendants, plea bargaining, once
established, held out specific advantages for judges,
prosecutors and defence attorneys. While not presented
here as causes of the rise of plea bargaining, these
advantages explain its “acceptance” by the court. For
judges, the practice provided a rejoinder to criticisms of
court discretion and reliance on precedent. While the
codification movement, which had sought to restrict
judicial discretion by moving to legislative statutes, had
failed, the threat posed by its underlying sentiment
remained. For judges, plea bargaining offered a new, more
conciliatory, customary means of maintaining discretion –
yet in a depersonalized, knowable and relatively predictable
market-like form that was more palatable to the masses.
Justices in the lower courts, whose salaries were annually
appropriated, also had reason to believe, rightly or not, that
they faced subtle pressure for consonance with the policies
of governor and legislature because of initiatives proposed
in the legislature to examine the performance of judges
individually during the appropriation process – an abortive
attempt at political review of the judiciary. Politically
motivated court reorganizations, that turned out all sitting
judges and appointed new ones, had also historically been
common. While judges were appointed by the governor for
life subject to good behaviour, the early decades of the 19th
century repeatedly saw court reorganizations, at both
federal and state levels, motivated at least in part by
politics, in which entire benches of sitting judges were
turned out and new ones appointed.
In this context, plea bargaining provided a low profile
and implicit form of discretion that facilitated sentencing
consistent with prevailing policies and purposes of
punishment.
In addition to Whig influence through judicial
appointments and social policy, there existed by 1840 a
tradition of judges, justices of the peace and district
attorneys who had careers that mixed judicial and political
life. Eventually, after 1858, district attorneys were elected
and prosecutors were linked to politics directly. This
heightened the value of the discretion that plea bargaining
accorded judges and prosecutors in cases that could colour
their political prospects. This is not to say that judges and
prosecutors crafted positions with an eye to political gain.
Reliance on plea bargaining, however, did accord them
latitude in high profile situations of consequence. This
connection between judges and prosecutors, on the one
hand, and elected office, on the other, is not one that
existed in England.
Plea bargaining also had other bureaucratic
consequences that served prosecutors and defence8
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attorneys as well. Cases in the lower court were usually
expeditiously handled by a judge alone with public
prosecutors rarely involved before 1850. While district
attorneys were salaried and so had no financial interest in
case outcomes, the 1830s saw the legislature first require
annual reports detailing court caseloads and dispositions.
This appears to have been part of the court reform
movement to establish impersonal and regularized justice.
Such rationalized reporting meant that a process which
inherently produced a high conviction rate grew desirable
as the century wore on and public prosecutors handled
more cases in the lower courts. While such required
reports contributed to growing emphasis on efficiency and
rational criteria of performance, their effect was limited in
the lower courts where cases were typically handled
without attorneys for either defence or prosecution.
Perhaps most salient, bargaining provided a daily power
resource for the prosecutor.
For defence attorneys, criminal cases were not
particularly lucrative, and so they stood to lose little in fees
as a result of expeditious bargaining. Though attorneys
often defended serious criminal cases, most lower court
cases, before mid-century, were resolved without defence
counsel so that attorneys lost virtually nothing at all. When
defence attorneys did appear, plea bargaining enhanced
their discretion as it did that of the prosecutor. Bargaining,
thus, closely safeguarded the prerogatives of judges, and to
the extent that they gradually came to serve in the lower
courts, of prosecutors and defence attorneys too. Because
plea bargaining served each actor well, it was variously
embraced or tolerated, rather than opposed, within the
courthouse.
Interestingly, while delay was a constant criticism in the
higher courts, all signs are that cases moved quickly
through the lower court – almost always reaching trial
before a judge within one day in the early part of the
century (Gil, 1837). This challenges the popular view that
caseload pressure in the courts may have given rise to plea
bargaining. The fact that caseload increased steadily over
the last half of the 19th century, while concessions
attendant to bargaining fluctuated, further challenges the
power of caseload as a cause.
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION AND SORTING
What was taking place was a form of social classification
and sorting. By relying on character witnesses, employment
histories, family ties and criminal records, the court was
clearly attempting to identify those who were hardworking
family people who had simply made one misstep in an
otherwise worthy life and who could be reclaimed as
productive workers and responsible citizens. These the
judges differentiated from marginals, transients and those
with few ties who were more often sentenced to serve time
at the house of industry or, later, the house of correction.
In selecting judges for the police court, great care was paid
to their educative capacities across a broad range of social
backgrounds.
In contrast to present day policy in the United States,
where imprisonment is growing more and more
widespread, the courts used the plea bargain initially
almost like a form of symbolic surety – re-embedding the
defendant, who is granted leniency, back into his or her
world of work and family amidst that most powerful, for
most persons, of all forms of social control – the web of
watchful relationships of everyday life. Those who had
testified symbolically staked their reputation on the
defendant’s future good behaviour and, thus, had an
interest in seeing the commitment kept.
LEGITIMATING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS
As the American republic set off into the 19th century,
self rule was an extraordinary experiment and, though
optimistic, no one knew whether it would survive. One
dilemma was that, as in any democracy, it became
particularly difficult for law to enforce order by coercion
because the very need to use force challenged and undercut
the claim of the regime to represent the “popular
sovereignty” of the citizen – the will of all. Thus, it became
vital for the regime to win the consent of the people to its
rule. In the new polity, governed no longer by monarchy
but rather by self-rule, there was a realization that social
order must rest, not on power or coercion, but instead on
popular acceptance of sovereign commands and on a sense
among the people of a duty to obey. A vision of political
authority was needed for a world of popular rule.
What emerged was, at first appearance, a conception of
modern political authority rooted in the “rule of law”. Yet,
despite the basic modernity of the new republic, that
authority, in practice, came to comprise a unique blend of
rational-legal and traditional elements. The world’s newest
republic turned to some of mankind’s oldest and “tried
and true” approaches to bolster authority amidst the
extraordinary adventure of self rule.
BLENDED FORM OF AUTHORITY:
RATIONAL-LEGAL AND TRADITIONAL
ELEMENTS
The result of this invocation of the rule of law and
concomitant turn to episodic leniency was a move in the
19th century United States toward a vision of political
authority that is, at first appearance, of a rational-legal sort
– that is, authority whose legitimation is based in the
enactment of rules in law and the specification of offices in
law.
Yet, as judges focused on the problem of creating
political authority anew, their reliance on tools of
discretionary leniency, in addition to the powerful
discourse of a “rule of law”, was quite shrewd. Despite the
basic post-Enlightenment modernity of the new 9
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“republic”, they were crafting authority of a unique blend
of modern rational-legal and traditional elements. There
was a strong sense that ideology unsupported by the
stabilizing influence of participation in an integrative
network of social roles could prove a fragile basis on which
to build social order. The Jacobin excesses in France had
been vividly seared into the collective American political
imagination and rioting in Britain prior to the Reform Act
of 1832 was well noted too.
Local politicians sensed that, along with laws, the
subjects of political authority that is solely rule-based
require the normative guidance that comes from a secure
place in the web and routines of social structure. During
the excesses of the 1790s following the French Revolution,
they believed those who had taken to the streets did so
because they had come detached from their places in the
habitual role structures and related rounds of activity of
everyday life. Because religion, social consensus and the
deference accorded status were all eroding apace, the
established view was that hierarchy and a sense of social
position had to be sustained lest the American masses be
turned out as radically unconstrained individuals whose
penchant for violence and excess might equal the French.
If political stability could be had in America, the
interconnected networks of social roles that honeycomb
society (ie, family, community and, especially, work) must,
it was believed, play a vital part.
New uses of leniency in the courts and the “symbolic
suretyship” that I have been describing were well-suited to
accomplish that embeddedness as defendants were turned
back to the community under the watchful eye of their
intercessors. In doing so, the plea bargain and other new
forms of leniency linked the rule-based authority of the
courts with the traditional authority that had historically
served as a cornerstone of the socializing web of communal
membership of everyday life.
Thus, the model of authority that emerged was a unique
mix of modern rational-legal and traditional authority. The
former based its legitimation, as noted a moment ago, in
the enactment of its rules and specification of its offices in
law which empowered a “rule of law”. The latter, which
relied on customary hierarchies and relationships (eg,
parents, spouses, employers, ministers, elders) legitimated
its claims on the behaviour of citizens through enduring
regard for the sacredness of custom which endowed the
relational web of membership of everyday life with a
formidable capacity for social control. Amidst open
turmoil of crime, riot and unrest, this was how the political
leadership of the day faced the, if anything, deeper
problem of translating the dreams of the framers of the
constitution, in practical terms, into an enduring social and
political order capable of wise political action. In that one
man’s authority is another man’s hegemony, dissent
nonetheless would continue to flourish.
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